Korea Digest No. 32 February 2026

 

KOREA DIGEST

 

Korea Digest is a monthly publication of the Korea Centre, School of International Relations and Politics, Mahatma Gandhi University, that compiles major political, security, economic, and diplomatic developments in the Korean Peninsula. Korea Digest aims to track, highlight, and provide a brief analysis of important developments in the Korean Peninsula.

Korea Digest No. 32 February 2026

Contents

1. North Korea Elevates Rural Transformation Drive as Core State Agenda
2. Korea–U.S. Tariff Tensions Escalate Before Partial Legal Reversal
3. North Korea Holds 9th Party Congress, Signals Five-Year Strategic Reset
4. Seoul Expands Security and Strategic Outreach to Europe and Southeast Asia
5. Seoul’s DMZ Management Proposal Raises Friction with UNC
6. U.N. Grants Humanitarian Sanctions Waiver as Rights Engagement Efforts Continue
7. China Adjusts Regional Posture With Yellow Sea Move and North Korea Outreach
8. Korea Expands Regional Diplomacy With ASEAN Council Meeting and Central Asia Summit Plan
9. Korea, Brazil Upgrade Ties to ‘Strategic Partnership’ During Lula’s State Visit 
10. Korea, Canada Deepen Defense Ties at ‘2+2’ Talks, Sign Intelligence Pact
11. Korea, UAE Advance $65 Billion Investment and Defense Cooperation Drive

Prepared by

Gourilakshmi S, Project Fellow, Korea Centre

1.North Korea Elevates Rural Transformation Drive as Core State Agenda

North Korea has intensified its regional development campaign ahead of the anticipated Ninth Party Congress, with leader Kim Jong-un and Premier Pak Thae-song framing rural modernization as the regime’s top priority. At a groundbreaking ceremony in Pyongwon County, Pak described Kim’s “Regional Development 20X10 Policy” which aimed at building modern industrial facilities in 20 cities and counties each year over a decade , as the party’s foremost objective to reduce urban-rural disparities and stimulate local economies.

Kim has personally overseen key projects under the initiative, including the inauguration of the Sinuiju Combined Greenhouse Farm in the flood-affected northwestern city of Sinuiju and the opening of the Sambaing Stockbreeding Farm in North Phyongan Province. The developments, featuring modern housing, solar power facilities and upgraded agricultural infrastructure, are being promoted as flagship achievements of the current party term.The regional development push is expected to feature prominently at the upcoming congress, where Pyongyang will outline its major policy goals for the next five years.

2. Korea–U.S. Tariff Tensions Escalate Before Partial Legal Reversal

Trade tensions between Seoul and Washington intensified after U.S. President Donald Trump threatened to raise reciprocal and auto tariffs on Korean goods from 15 percent to 25 percent, citing delays in Seoul’s passage of a special bill tied to a $350 billion U.S. investment package. Despite back-to-back visits to Washington by Industry Minister Kim Jung-kwan, Trade Minister Yeo Han-koo and Foreign Minister Cho Hyun, the U.S. moved toward formalizing the hike through publication in the Federal Register.

Prime Minister Kim Min-seok rejected claims of diplomatic failure, attributing the move to internal U.S. policy dynamics and dissatisfaction over the pace of legislative implementation. Washington signaled frustration over the National Assembly’s delay in advancing the investment bill, while Seoul warned that tariff friction was beginning to spill over into broader security cooperation, including nuclear energy and submarine discussions.

As publication of the tariff hike appeared imminent, Seoul shifted strategy toward seeking a delay in implementation to secure time for legislative progress and further negotiations.Later in the month, however, the Supreme Court of the United States struck down Trump’s reciprocal tariffs imposed under the 1977 International Emergency Economic Powers Act, effectively nullifying the 15 percent tariff on Korean goods under that legal basis. Seoul said roughly 6,000 exporters could be eligible for refunds, though duties imposed under other U.S. trade laws, including those affecting steel and automobiles remain in force.

 

3.North Korea Holds 9th Party Congress, Signals Five-Year Strategic Reset

North Korea convened the Ninth Congress of the Workers’ Party of Korea, its first party congress since 2021, setting policy directions for 2026–2030 amid close scrutiny over possible shifts in foreign and security strategy.Leader Kim Jong-un declared a new era of “upsurge” in national development, praising the party’s achievements and outlining goals for economic stabilization, defense modernization and “gradual qualitative development” over the next five years. Sectoral meetings reviewed draft proposals covering the economy, national defense and regional development, with final decisions expected at the closing session.

The congress drew particular attention over speculation that Kim could formally adopt the title of president through follow-up procedures at the Supreme People’s Assembly a move that would further consolidate his authority. Observers also watched for signals toward Washington and Seoul, especially as the five-year plan overlaps with U.S. President Donald Trump’s second term.Notably, the congress appeared to reaffirm Pyongyang’s dual-track emphasis on economic resilience and strategic deterrence, signaling continuity rather than abrupt policy change. The outcomes are expected to shape North Korea’s domestic governance and external posture through the end of the decade, particularly in the context of evolving regional security dynamics in Northeast Asia.

 

4.Seoul Expands Security and Strategic Outreach to Europe and Southeast Asia

On Feb. 2, Korea and Poland held their inaugural security strategy dialogue in Warsaw, agreeing to strengthen consultations and information sharing on developments on the Korean Peninsula. The talks brought together Jeong Yeon-doo, Korea’s vice minister for diplomatic strategy and intelligence, and Robert Kupiecki, Poland’s undersecretary of state for security policy. Both sides underscored the growing security linkage between Europe and Northeast Asia and pledged to deepen cooperation through long-term strategic coordination, particularly as defense industry partners.

Later in the month, President Lee Jae Myung announced state visits to Singapore and the Philippines aimed at reinforcing Seoul’s diplomatic and economic footprint in Southeast Asia. In Singapore, Lee is scheduled to hold a summit with Prime Minister Lawrence Wong, meet President Tharman Shanmugaratnam and attend the AI Connect Summit to expand cooperation in trade, infrastructure, artificial intelligence and nuclear power. In Manila, Lee will meet President Ferdinand Romualdez Marcos Jr. for summit talks and a state banquet coinciding with the 77th anniversary of bilateral diplomatic ties. The visits are positioned as part of Seoul’s broader effort to advance its Comprehensive Strategic Partnership vision with Asean and strengthen collaboration in defense, infrastructure, critical minerals, shipbuilding and emerging technologies.

 

5.Seoul’s DMZ Management Proposal Raises Friction with UNC

In early February, South Korea confirmed consultations with the U.S.-led United Nations Command (UNC) over a proposal to adjust management authority in parts of the Demilitarized Zone (DMZ). The Defense Ministry is seeking greater oversight of civilian access to sections located south of the barbed-wire fence but north of the Southern Limit Line  areas that account for up to 30–50 percent of the southern half of the 255-kilometer buffer zone.

The plan would allow the South Korean military to oversee entry into certain areas, including parts of the DMZ Peace Trail in Goseong, where the government has expressed interest in reopening suspended routes. Officials argue that geographical adjustments to fencing since the 1960s have created discrepancies with the original armistice boundaries, making a more “realistic” management approach necessary. However, the proposal  coupled with a pending DMZ access bill promoted by the Unification Ministry and the ruling party has prompted concern from the UNC, which reiterated its role as administrator of the DMZ under the 1953 armistice agreement. Some UNC officials warned that legislative changes could be viewed as undermining the armistice framework. Seoul, for its part, maintains that it is not seeking full jurisdiction but practical coordination to ensure stable and effective management while preserving alliance cooperation.

 

6.U.N. Grants Humanitarian Sanctions Waiver as Rights Engagement Efforts Continue

On Feb. 6, the United Nations Security Council’s 1718 sanctions committee unanimously approved exemptions for 17 humanitarian aid projects targeting North Korea, marking a potential opening in stalled diplomatic dynamics. The waiver, granted after months of procedural delays, covers projects led by South Korea, the United States and international organizations, including the World Health Organization, UNICEF and the Food and Agriculture Organization. The initiatives focus on health care, water and sanitation, and nutritional support for vulnerable groups.

The decision followed talks in Washington between Foreign Minister Cho Hyun and U.S. Secretary of State Marco Rubio, where a senior Seoul official hinted at a forthcoming “good faith gesture” in North Korea-related diplomacy. While humanitarian aid is permitted under U.N. sanctions, formal exemptions are required for equipment and materials otherwise restricted under the sanctions regime. Seoul expressed hope that Pyongyang would respond positively, though North Korea has previously rejected some international assistance amid broader sanctions tensions. Separately, U.N. Special Rapporteur on North Korean human rights Elizabeth Salmon met Second Vice Foreign Minister Kim Jina and reaffirmed her commitment to supporting dialogue and engagement with Pyongyang. Salmon pledged to continue encouraging North Korea’s cooperation with international human rights mechanisms and will present her annual findings to the U.N. Human Rights Council in March and the General Assembly in September. The parallel developments highlighted Seoul’s dual-track approach of sustaining humanitarian and human rights engagement while seeking diplomatic space for broader reengagement.

7.China Adjusts Regional Posture With Yellow Sea Move and North Korea Outreach

China signaled a calibrated diplomatic approach on the Korean Peninsula this month, relocating a contentious offshore platform from the Yellow Sea while its ambassador to North Korea made a high-profile Lunar New Year visit to a newly opened coastal resort.Satellite imagery released by the Washington-based Center for Strategic and International Studies confirmed that the semi-fixed platform known as Atlantic Amsterdam was removed from the Provisional Measures Zone (PMZ) and transported to a shipyard in Weihai in late January. The structure , converted from an oil-drilling rig and equipped with a helipad  had drawn scrutiny in Seoul over potential dual-use capabilities, even though Beijing has maintained it was intended for aquaculture management.

The relocation followed a Jan. 5 summit between South Korean President Lee Jae Myung and Chinese President Xi Jinping, during which both sides reportedly agreed to address the most sensitive installation first. South Korea described the move as a meaningful step toward easing maritime tensions, though two other Chinese aquaculture platforms and multiple buoys remain inside the jointly managed PMZ.Beijing characterized the relocation as a business decision by a private company, a framing analysts say allows China to reduce diplomatic friction without altering its broader legal stance on maritime rights in the Yellow Sea.

Days later, China’s ambassador to North Korea, Wang Yajun, visited the Wonsan-Kalma Coastal Tourist Zone during Lunar New Year celebrations, according to the Korean Central News Agency. The trip marked the first reported visit by Chinese Embassy officials to the beach resort since its opening last July. North Korea’s Foreign Ministry hosted a banquet for the occasion, where participants pledged to strengthen bilateral ties. Pyongyang has been promoting tourism  including the Wonsan-Kalma complex, which can reportedly host around 20,000 visitors  as a source of foreign currency under international sanctions. While Russian tour groups have resumed visits, Chinese tourist flows have yet to recover to pre-pandemic levels. Taken together, the Yellow Sea relocation and the diplomatic outreach in North Korea reflect Beijing’s effort to carefully manage its regional relationships. By easing one maritime flashpoint with Seoul while reaffirming traditional ties with Pyongyang, China appears to be balancing strategic interests on both fronts without making fundamental policy shifts.

8.Korea Expands Regional Diplomacy With ASEAN Council Meeting and Central Asia Summit Plan

South Korea signaled a broader push to deepen regional partnerships, hosting the 18th Annual Council Meeting of the ASEAN-Korea Centre in Seoul while announcing plans for its first summit with Central Asian states later this year.At the council meeting held at The Westin Josun Seoul, senior officials from Korea and the 10 ASEAN member states reviewed the center’s 2025 achievements and approved its 2026 work plan and budget. The center plans to roll out around 30 programs across economic cooperation, culture and tourism, media initiatives and people-to-people exchanges. A new ASEAN Hall will open in Jeonju, adding to existing halls in Seoul and on Jeju Island. Secretary General Kim Jae-shin and Deputy Foreign Minister Chung Eui-hae attended the session alongside ASEAN ambassadors, underscoring the institutional foundation of Korea-ASEAN ties.

Separately, the Foreign Ministry confirmed that Korea will host its first summit with five Central Asian countries , Kazakhstan, Uzbekistan, Turkmenistan, Tajikistan and Kyrgyzstan on Sept. 16–17. Foreign Minister Cho Hyun said the summit will build on the New Northern Policy, launched under former President Moon Jae-in, to expand cooperation across Eurasia. Officials said the Central Asia summit will focus on strengthening economic collaboration, diversifying supply chains and supporting ethnic Korean communities in the region. Taken together, the ASEAN council meeting and the planned Central Asia summit reflect Seoul’s strategy to widen its diplomatic and economic footprint across both Southeast and Central Asia.

9.Korea, Brazil Upgrade Ties to ‘Strategic Partnership’ During Lula’s State Visit

South Korea and Brazil agreed to elevate bilateral relations to a “strategic partnership” during Brazilian President Luiz Inacio Lula da Silva’s three-day state visit to Seoul, marking the first such visit by a Brazilian leader in 21 years.President Lee Jae Myung welcomed Lula at the Blue House, where the two leaders held summit talks, oversaw the signing of 10 memorandums of understanding and announced a four-year action plan for 2026–2029. The plan spans political dialogue, trade and investment, energy and the environment, science and technology, and cultural and educational exchanges.

At a joint press briefing, Lee described the summit as “a historic day” that would guide cooperation across a wide range of sectors. Both sides pledged to expand collaboration in critical minerals, supply chains, defense, aerospace and agriculture. Lula highlighted Brazil’s vast reserves of rare earth elements and nickel, expressing hope for increased Korean investment, while also calling for closer cooperation in green industries and forest conservation initiatives.The leaders also discussed resuming negotiations for a trade agreement between Korea and Mercosur, South America’s largest trade bloc, as part of efforts to boost economic ties. Annual trade between the two countries has exceeded $10 billion in recent years, and Brazil remains Korea’s largest partner in South America. The visit was marked by notable personal warmth between the two presidents, who have often referenced their shared past as teenage factory workers. Lee posted an AI-generated video depicting the two leaders as youths embracing, writing that he was dedicating it to his “brother” Lula. Lula responded publicly with a message of appreciation.

In a symbolic gesture during a visit to the Seoul National Cemetery, Lula was provided with a custom-made glove tailored to accommodate the finger he lost in a factory accident as a young worker — a detail that drew attention after footage was shared online.The state visit also featured a business forum attended by top corporate leaders from both countries and a state banquet blending Korean and Brazilian cuisine. First lady Kim Hea Kyung presented Lula’s wife with a custom-made hanbok, underscoring the emphasis on cultural exchange alongside economic and strategic cooperation.Taken together, the summit and accompanying events signaled a concerted effort by Seoul and Brasília to deepen political trust and broaden substantive cooperation, grounded in both shared economic interests and the leaders’ personal rapport.

President Lee Jae Myung, center right, and Brazilian President Luiz Inacio Lula da Silva, center left, toast at the state banquet at the Blue House in central Seoul on Feb. 23, after their summit talks. They are joined by first ladies Kim Hea Kyung, far left, and Rosangela Lula da Silva, far right, wearing matching hanbok, or traditional Korean attire. [JOINT PRESS CORPS]

 

10.Korea, Canada Deepen Defense Ties at ‘2+2’ Talks, Sign Intelligence Pact

South Korea and Canada held their “two-plus-two” foreign and defense ministerial talks in Ottawa this week, underscoring closer security coordination and Seoul’s bid to secure Canada’s next-generation submarine project. Foreign Minister Cho Hyun and Defense Minister Ahn Gyu-back met their Canadian counterparts, Foreign Minister Anita Anand and Defense Minister David McGuinty, for the high-level talks. The meeting was followed by the signing of an agreement on the protection of military and defense classified information, establishing a secure framework for intelligence sharing.The talks came as Seoul intensifies efforts to win Canada’s Patrol Submarine Project, estimated at around 60 trillion won ($41 billion), to supply up to 12 submarines. A Korean consortium of Hanwha Ocean and HD Hyundai Heavy Industries is competing against Germany’s ThyssenKrupp Marine Systems for the contract.During a joint press conference, Cho emphasized Korea’s ability to deliver submarines “on time” and “within budget,” adding that Seoul could complete deliveries two years ahead of its German rival. He also highlighted potential economic benefits, including job creation and technology transfer, if Korea secures the deal.

Ahn stressed Korea’s “cutting-edge” submarine technologies, citing operational experience in complex maritime conditions around the Korean Peninsula. He suggested that Korea’s conventional submarines would also be well-suited for Arctic operations, a key consideration for Canada.For their part, Canadian officials pledged a fair and objective procurement process. McGuinty described the submarine project as likely the largest defense acquisition in Canada’s history and noted that a new government agency has been established to oversee negotiations independently.

Beyond the submarine bid, the ministers agreed to update the Korea-Canada comprehensive strategic partnership to reflect evolving security and economic realities. They also committed to launching negotiations toward a broader defense cooperation agreement aimed at deepening operational collaboration between their armed forces.Anand said the two countries would continue working together to reinforce a “free, open and secure Indo-Pacific region,” highlighting shared interests amid growing geopolitical uncertainties.The latest round of talks marks a continuation of regular high-level security consultations between Seoul and Ottawa, with both sides signaling intent to expand cooperation in defense, intelligence sharing and strategic communications.

11.Korea, UAE Advance $65 Billion Investment and Defense Cooperation Drive

South Korea and the United Arab Emirates agreed to pursue joint projects worth over $65 billion, including major defense industry cooperation, following a three-day visit to Abu Dhabi by presidential chief of staff Kang Hoon-sik.Speaking upon his return, Kang said the two sides committed to projects totaling more than $65 billion — $35 billion in defense and $30 billion in broader investment cooperation. The visit was made in his capacity as special envoy for President Lee Jae Myung.

In the defense sector, both countries agreed to move beyond a traditional buyer-seller model and cooperate across the full life cycle of defense systems, from design and training to maintenance and repair. They signed a framework memorandum of understanding outlining principles for expanded defense industry collaboration, with Seoul aiming to translate the MOU into final contracts.The UAE’s previously pledged $30 billion investment in Korea will also be restructured around strategic sectors such as defense, artificial intelligence, nuclear power and culture. The two sides plan to establish sector-specific working groups to accelerate follow-up talks and produce tangible outcomes by the next bilateral summit, where a new investment cooperation MOU is expected to be signed.

Building on prior collaboration at the Barakah nuclear power plant, the countries agreed to expand energy cooperation across the entire nuclear power life cycle, including fuel supply, plant maintenance and the integration of AI technologies into operations. With global electricity demand rising, they will also explore a joint overseas expansion strategy in the nuclear sector. The agreements reflect Seoul’s broader push to solidify long-term strategic and economic partnerships in the Middle East, spanning defense, advanced technology and energy sectors.

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