Devi Chandana.M
The author is a PhD Scholar at the School of International Relations and Politics (SIRP), Mahatma Gandhi University, Kerala. This article was an outcome of the ‘Korea Centre Summer Internship Programme.
Abstract
India and South Korea are key players in the shaping of the Indo-Pacific, balancing strategic
interests under changing regional geopolitics. India's Indo-Pacific policy, driven by the Act
East Policy and the Indo-Pacific Oceans Initiative, focuses on maritime security and regional
connectivity. South Korea's Indo-Pacific Strategy, coordinated with its New Southern Policy,
seeks economic engagement and multilateralism with strategic autonomy. In spite of varying
strategies, both countries are committed to a rules-based order, trade collaboration, and
technological development. Deepening cooperation in defense, energy, and infrastructure will
create greater regional stability and economic resilience and make them major drivers of the
future Indo-Pacific.
Introduction
The Indo-Pacific has emerged as the defining geopolitical and economic theatre of the 21st century, shaping global trade, maritime security, and strategic partnerships. As major powers such as the United States and China compete for dominance, regional players like India and South Korea have formulated distinct yet overlapping visions for engaging with this dynamic region. Their strategies reflect national interests, historical experiences, and geopolitical realities, making a comparative analysis crucial to understanding the evolving Indo-Pacific order. India’s Indo-Pacific strategy, shaped by its Act East Policy (2014) and Indo-Pacific Oceans Initiative, underscores its commitment to regional security, maritime freedom, and counterbalancing China. India is strengthening strategic partnerships with nations that support a free, open, and inclusive Indo-Pacific to reinforce regional stability and protect its economic and security interests. South Korea, on the other hand, adopts a more economic-centric approach through its New Southern Policy (2017) and Indo-Pacific Strategy (2022), prioritizing multilateralism, economic connectivity, and technological cooperation. A middle power, South Korea is required to balance its alliances with the United States and its economic dependence on China, hence requiring a subtle diplomatic strategy.
This paper looks at the convergence and divergence between India’s and South Korea’s Indo-Pacific strategies. Both nations share the same commitments toward a rules-based order, economic cooperation, and maritime security, yet each has its geopolitical context that shapes its distinct strategic priorities. India focuses on security and strategic partnerships, while for South Korea, economic engagement and regional connectivity are top priorities. Understanding these differences, therefore, remains crucial in examining how middle and emerging powers cope with the balance of power structure in the Indo-Pacific. As such, the study provides timely insights into what is shaping and will shape this new landscape into which India and South Korea interact. Comparing their policies sheds light on what has been previously discussed on broader regional security topics, multilateralism, and economic diplomacy.
The Indo-Pacific: Concept, Evolution, and Strategic Implications
The “Indo-Pacific” has come to represent a major 21st-century geopolitical idea to define the vast and dynamic areas of the Indian Ocean and Pacific Ocean. It is an increasingly important region of global concern owing to economic interdependencies and complex security ties that have placed this region at the center of strategic debate. The concept of Indo-Pacific has also changed as a response to power shifts, especially following the emergence of China and the strategic interests of the United States, India, Japan, Australia, and other regional actors (Nath & Klingebiel, 2023) .
Though world regions are theoretically built and conceived based on geopolitical interests, the contemporary Indo-Pacific concept was eloquently defined by Japanese Prime Minister Shinzo Abe in 2007, while delivering a speech in New Delhi. Abe was against employing the “Asia-Pacific” since it did not include India’s role and thus initiated the idea of Indo-Pacific as a response to India’s strategic role (Nath & Klingebiel, 2023). The concept gained root soon enough with the great powers having their approach to regional involvement being impacted.
Many nations by the 2010s had embraced Indo-Pacific strategies as a way of containing China’s rise. They are the United States, the European Union, Japan, Australia, and ASEAN, integrating the Indo-Pacific paradigm into foreign policy, emphasizing economic interdependence, maritime security, and a rules-based international order (Heiduk & Wacker, 2020). China denies the Indo-Pacific narrative as a Western conspiracy to contain its growth (Nath & Klingebiel, 2023).
Indo-Pacific” describes more than a geographical difference; it is a strategic entity and economic interdependence between the Pacific and Indian Oceans, uniting varied nations, societies, and economies (Nath & Klingebiel, 2023). The maritime aspect is key, for the Indo-Pacific comprises important trade routes, chokepoints, and naval encounters. Yet land connectivity also applies, especially through infrastructure projects that connect the region’s economies. For instance, initiatives such as the India-Myanmar-Thailand Trilateral Highway and China’s Belt and Road Initiative (BRI) bring the Indo-Pacific’s presence inland, with regional trade, economic integration, and strategic connectivity (Heiduk & Wacker, 2020).
The concept of the Indo-Pacific emerged to the fore in the first decade of the 21st century as countries started to pragmatically interact with the region in realizing that what happens in one oceanic region has a significant bearing on the other. The emergence of China’s maritime assertiveness, growing interdependencies of trade, and demands for supply resilience have all propelled the articulation of Indo-Pacific policies by great powers. The Indo-Pacific vision is economic, political, and security-oriented, and encapsulates the vision of an open, free, and inclusive region with a rules-based international order. The vision is aligned with the strategic interests of principal regional and global powers, including the United States, India, Japan, and Australia. While Australia is not ranked as a “great power” in global geopolitics, it has a significant role to play in Indo-Pacific security and economic affairs. Through its Indo-Pacific policy, Australia has been actively deepening defence cooperation, particularly in alliances like the Quad and AUKUS, and through ASEAN and Pacific Islands engagement (Nath & Klingebiel, 2023).
The Indo-Pacific term was originally coined by German geopolitician Karl Haushofer in the 1920s. Haushofer dreamed of an Indo-Pacific area where Japan, China, and India, having been freed from Western colonial control, would join forces with Germany against Western imperialism (Teekah & Ethan, 2025).In contemporary times, the phrase attained strategic significance at the hands of Japanese Prime Minister Shinzo Abe. Abe’s 2007 address “Confluence of the Two Seas” envisioned a unifying of the Indian and Pacific Oceans as a unified strategic region with stress on collaboration between Japan and India. (King, n.d.).The United States also made the term more popular during President Donald Trump’s tenure, embracing the “Free and Open Indo-Pacific” approach to counter China’s increasing presence in the region (Heiduk & Wacker, 2020).The “Indo-Pacific” idea has therefore come a long way from its beginnings in the early 20th century to become a key paradigm in contemporary geopolitical thought.
The security implications of the Indo-Pacific idea are deep, considering the strategic significance of the region and several flashpoints. One of the main concerns is China’s competing claims and growing militarization of the South China Sea, which the United States and its allies see as a threat to freedom of navigation and overflight key principles for regional stability (Calupitan, 2025) . This has made the Indo-Pacific a war zone for wider geopolitics rivalries, which have led countries in the region to rebalance their security roles and enhance strategic alignments.
The United States, India, Japan, and Australia’s Quadrilateral Security Dialogue (Quad) is at the forefront of this new order of security. Established originally in 2007, the Quad has now turned into a strategic dialogue forum for maritime security, economic interaction, and security in the region (Australia and China Trade Blame Over Fighter Jet Incident in South China Sea, 2025) . Not a traditional military alliance, it is rather a balancing act against China’s increasing presence, increasing combined military exercises, technology cooperation, and security of supply chains. In the midst of persistent tensions in the Indo-Pacific, the Quad continues to be committed to augmenting the promotion of a rules-based order, with interactions with ASEAN and other regional platforms for promoting stability in the region (Lee et al., 2025).
South Korea’s Indo-Pacific Strategy, introduced in December 2022, is a strategic shift toward active regional engagement with the goal of striking balance between relations with key players like the United States and China. The strategy prioritizes a rules-based order, technological progress, and economic resilience and positions South Korea as a “Global Pivotal State” in alignment with regional stability (Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Republic of Korea, 2022).
As the Indo-Pacific’s dynamics shift, how the strategic interests interact among regional powers will dictate its future ahead of any particular state’s action. South Korea’s move is reflective of embracing such a multipolar reality to balance multi-faced relationships and to be able to make its mark in the region (S. Lee, 2022).
Nonetheless, South Korea’s middle power status is cemented inexorably in the existing regional framework, traditionally occupied by American dominance. South Korea has to be a master of diplomacy, particularly under the realities of the shifting power balance and the re-emergence of China. South Korea must walk gingerly with its alliances and relations to continue being relevant and contribute meaningfully towards Indo-Pacific peace (Shin, 2022).
India and South Korea are important to increase cooperation on maritime security, trade, and technology to create a stable Indo-Pacific. South Korea’s Indo-Pacific Strategy (2022) is its attempt to balance between the U.S. and China, prioritizing a rules-based order, economic resilience, and technological advancement. With the changing regional dynamics, the destiny of the Indo-Pacific will be determined by strategic engagements between principal powers and not by any individual country. The middle power position of South Korea relies on sensitive diplomacy in the face of changing power competitions within the region.
South Korea and India in the Indo-Pacific
The Indo-Pacific has also become a nexus of geopolitical contest and cooperation for great powers like South Korea and India, who both see it as important for national interests, regional stability, and global economic trends. South Korea’s Indo-Pacific Strategy, launched in December 2022, indicates its desire to be more actively involved in the region, emphasizing a rules-based order, technological innovation, and economic resilience (Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Republic of Korea, 2022). This is in line with India’s Act East Policy, which encourages regional connectivity, economic cooperation, and security cooperation in the Indo-Pacific. While both nations want a secure and prosperous Indo-Pacific, they differ in their methods India, motivated by its strategic competition with China, takes an active part in security arrangements like the Quad, while South Korea, navigating relationships with both the United States and China, is more circumspect in strategic alignments (Lee, 2022).
Although South Korea is generally rated as a middle power, economic and technological expanding influence has drawn some analyses predicting that it should be included amongst the world powers by 2025, the same as United States, China, India, Japan, Russia, Germany, and the United Kingdom (Farley, 2024). Despite this, however, its local security stance does not resemble India’s, which needs to grapple with both economic interdependence with China as well as defence partnership with America (Shin, 2022) .
Albeit with different strategic orientations, both nations have convergent interests in maritime security, economic interconnectivity, and a rules-based international order. Deepening cooperation in the fields of infrastructure development, technology, and defence cooperation could not only enhance bilateral relationships but also bring about greater regional stability and prosperity in the Indo-Pacific. Yet their capacity to cooperate will hinge on the ability to navigate their respective ties with the great powers, keeping their strategic interests aligned while navigating regional intricacies.
South Korea’s Approach to the Indo-Pacific
South Korea’s Indo-Pacific Strategy, which was unveiled in December 2022, represents a strategic turn in the foreign policy of the country, demonstrating its desire to be more proactive in the region. In contrast to the classical Indo-Pacific strategies of military and security alignments, South Korea’s strategy is inclusive, multidimensional, and diplomatic in nature, prioritizing economic security, technological primacy, and rules-based regional order (Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Republic of Korea, 2022). The strategy supports South Korea’s aspiration to become a “Global Pivotal State” with an even-handed balancing act between major powers such as the U.S. and China, as well as the reinforcement of regional alliances, especially with ASEAN and India.
A hallmark of South Korea’s Indo-Pacific strategy is its sensitive balancing act between economic and security interests. South Korea is a U.S. treaty ally that guarantees defense against North Korea and general Indo-Pacific security cooperation. Concurrently, China is still South Korea’s biggest trading partner, with more than 25% of its exports (US-China Strategic Rivalry, South Korea’s Strategic Choices, and Implications for German and South Korea Cooperation, 2023). This interdependence creates it challenging for South Korea to also completely become aligned with U.S.-led containment policies against China while remaining economically stable.
Instead of adopting an assertive stance, South Korea’s Indo-Pacific strategy is ushering in inclusivity and multilateralism, calling for cooperation with the U.S. and China alike while keeping its economic and security interests intact. Still, China has grown increasingly skeptical of Indo-Pacific strategies, viewing them as a containment measure against its expansion. South Korea’s dilemma is to preserve strategic autonomy while enhancing security partnership with like-minded countries, including the U.S., Japan, and ASEAN.
South Korea’s Indo-Pacific Strategy, announced in December 2022, outlines the country’s overall strategy for creating a “free, peaceful, and prosperous Indo-Pacific region.” The strategy highlights South Korea’s pledge to deepen its diplomatic and economic activities throughout the Indo-Pacific while emphasizing inclusivity, trust, and reciprocity as guiding principles.
Geographical Scope and Vision
The strategy expands South Korea’s overseas policy horizon to include Southeast Asia, South Asia, Oceania, and the Indian Ocean-facing east coast of Africa. The expansion is based on an appreciation of the importance of the Indo-Pacific since the region is home to 65% of the world’s population, 62% of the world GDP, and 46% of global trade. Remarkably, nearly 78% of South Korea’s exports and 67% of its imports cross this region, emphasizing its sheer significance to the country’s economic well-being(Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Republic of Korea, n.d.).
Core Principles
South Korea’s policy is based on three core principles:
- Inclusiveness: The policy is created to be an inclusive effort that neither singles out nor excludes any particular country, fostering cooperation through a diverse array of nations.
- Trust: Prioritizing secure partnerships, South Korea aims to establish trust relations to tackle local issues together.
- Reciprocity: The country pursues reciprocally helpful cooperation, noting that successful interactions are those with benefits for every participant (Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Republic of Korea, n.d.).
Strategic Objectives
The strategy describes a number of main goals:
- Strengthening the Rules-Based Order: South Korea will continue to adhere to international rules and norms, especially in oceanic regions such as the South China Sea, to guarantee stability and freedom of navigation.
- Building Economic Security and Supply Chain Resilience: In consideration of the vulnerability of overdependence on one market, the strategy prioritizes diversification of supply chains and diminishing dependence on certain countries for vital industries, such as semiconductors and energy.
- Encouraging Technological Collaboration: South Korea wishes to enhance its position in the emerging technologies such as artificial intelligence, cybersecurity, and green energy, driving innovation through global partnership.
- Enhancing ASEAN and Indian Engagement: The plan lays out Southeast Asia and India as key partners and seeks to deepen economic connections and diplomatic engagement in order to respond collectively to regional challenges.
- Enhancing Maritime Security Cooperation: Through joint naval exercises and backing counter-piracy efforts, South Korea seeks to enhance regional stability with allies such as Australia and Japan (Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Republic of Korea, n.d.).
Balancing Relations with Major Powers
One of the most critical elements of the strategy is managing the intricate relationship between the United States and China. While South Korea has a strong security partnership with the U.S., China is its biggest trading partner. The strategy calls for the need to maintain a balanced approach in trying to promote a rules-based order without antagonizing either of the two great powers. This fine balancing act is crucial for South Korea to protect its national interests in the face of increasing U.S.-China strategic rivalry(Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Republic of Korea, n.d.).
Implementation and Future Outlook
To make this strategy operational, South Korea has crafted an action plan with concrete initiatives and cooperative endeavors. It involves holding the Korea-Pacific Islands Summit in May 2023 to enhance cooperation with Pacific states and tackling common issues like climate change and sustainable development(REPORT: Declaration and Action Plan of the 1st Korea-Pacific Leaders’ Summit, 2023 | Pacific Islands Forum Secretariat, n.d.).
Overall, South Korea’s Indo-Pacific Strategy is an active and balanced approach to regional interaction. By adhering to values of inclusiveness, trust, and reciprocity, and by prioritizing strategic goals that attend to both security and economic concerns, South Korea seeks to become a key actor in shaping the future of the Indo-Pacific region.
India’s Role in the Indo-Pacific
India does not have a single, consolidated document titled “Indo-Pacific Strategy.” Instead, its vision and approach toward the Indo-Pacific region are articulated through various policy statements, strategic initiatives, and joint declarations. Key among these are the Act East Policy, the Security and Growth for All in the Region (SAGAR) initiative, and several bilateral and multilateral agreements that collectively outline India’s strategic outlook in the Indo-Pacific (QUESTION NO-1456 INDIA’S ACT-EAST POLICY, 2023).
India’s vision for the Indo-Pacific is enunciated through several policy frameworks and strategic endeavors, consistent with its adherence to a free, open, and inclusive Indo-Pacific region. The fulcrum of this vision is the Act East Policy, launched in 2014, with the objective of augmenting economic engagement, cultural relations, and strategic ties with nations in the Indo-Pacific region. This policy is focused on interaction at bilateral, regional, and multilateral levels, thus ensuring comprehensive connectivity in the form of political, economic, cultural, and people-to-people ties (India Stands for Free & Rules-based Indo-Pacific Crucial for Economic Development of the Region & Wider Global Community, Says Raksha Mantri at Indo-Pacific Regional Dialogue in New Delhi, 2022), This is supplemented by the Security and Growth for All in the Region (SAGAR) strategy, enunciated by Prime Minister Narendra Modi in 2015. SAGAR reinforces India as a net security provider in the Indian Ocean region through cooperative approaches towards sustainable economic and security interests for littoral states (Address by External Affairs Minister, Dr. S. Jaishankar at the Chulalongkorn University on “‘India’s Vision of the Indo-Pacific,’” 2022).
In 2019, India renewed its pledge to the Indo-Pacific by initiating the Indo-Pacific Oceans Initiative (IPOI). The purpose of this initiative is to ensure a secure, stable, and safe maritime space, in conformity with Sustainable Development Goal 14, which asks for the sustainable use and conservation of ocean resources (Prime Minister’s Speech at the East Asia Summit, 04 November 2019, 2019). India’s participation in the Quadrilateral Security Dialogue (Quad) with the United States, Japan, and Australia reflects its commitment to advancing a rules-based international order. The Quad emphasizes working together practically to promote an open, free, and inclusive Indo-Pacific that is prosperous and resilient (“Quad Brief 2023,” 2023).India’s economic vision of Atmanirbhar Bharat (Self-Reliant India) is central to its Indo-Pacific approach. This vision strives for building domestic capacities and enabling international partnerships to place India as a major contributor in regional and global value chains (Address by EAM, Dr. S. Jaishankar at the Annual General Meeting of FICCI, New Delhi (December 09, 2023), 2023).Together, these initiatives and policies reflect India’s comprehensive vision of the Indo-Pacific, looking to strengthen regional stability, security, and prosperity through cooperative and inclusive frameworks.
Balancing Official Policy and Strategic Vision: Dr. S. Jaishankar’s Perspective
While India’s Indo-Pacific policy is mostly expressed through formal policies like the Act East Policy, SAGAR, and the Indo-Pacific Oceans Initiative (IPOI), strategic perspectives from policymakers like Dr. S. Jaishankar offer more background to India’s changing role in the region. In The India Way: Strategies for an Uncertain World, Jaishankar delineates the Indo-Pacific as a major geopolitical arena, defined by China’s increasing power, America’s strategic recalibration, and the spread of India’s regional influence (Jaishankar, 2022). Jaishankar rejects the idea of a unipolar or bipolar order and promotes instead a multilateral Indo-Pacific in which India claims its strategic autonomy. This is consistent with India’s official policy, supporting issue-based alliances instead of fixed ones (QUESTION NO-1456 INDIA’S ACT-EAST POLICY, 2023).
Jaishankar further points out the security threats resulting from China’s assertiveness, especially in the Indian Ocean and the South China Sea. He emphasizes India’s strengthening of its maritime strength and increased engagement with such like-minded countries, as exemplified by the Quad (India, U.S., Japan, Australia) (Jaishankar, 2022). India’s stated Indo-Pacific policy reinforces this strategic emphasis, including freedom of navigation, a rules-based order, and regional security cooperation (Address by External Affairs Minister, Dr. S. Jaishankar at the Chulalongkorn University on “‘India’s Vision of the Indo-Pacific,’” 2022). Still, Jaishankar urges also pragmatism in managing the India-China relationship, blending deterrence and engagement, as it fits into India’s diplomatic practice of upholding economic connectivity alongside countering strategic challenges.
Connectivity of economies is the second overarching concern throughout Jaishankar’s texts and in India’s declared Indo-Pacific strategy. In Why Bharat Matters, he further elaborates on India’s economic resurgence, calling for a self-reliant India (Atmanirbhar Bharat) that minimizes external dependence and reinforces regional economic interaction (Jaishankar, 2024). It is consistent with India’s emphasis on promoting regional trade, infrastructure, and supply chain resilience through IPOI, IPEF, and bilateral trade arrangements .Whereas Jaishankar condemns China’s leadership in international supply chains, India’s own official Indo-Pacific strategy aims to offer alternative, transparent, and domestically owned infrastructure projects as opposed to China’s Belt and Road Initiative (BRI).
While “ The India Way” and “Why Bharat Matters” are not policy papers, they provide intellectual richness to India’s Indo-Pacific approach, indicative of Jaishankar’s diplomatic vision. As India’s External Affairs Minister, his observations closely track India’s overall Indo-Pacific approach but need to be seen as complementary viewpoints and not direct policy roadmaps.
Overall, India’s Indo-Pacific policy is characterized by formal diplomatic action, and Jaishankar’s work adds strategic vision to what India is to be in a changing multipolar world. Both reiterate India’s long-term interests of security, economic strength, and strategic autonomy so that the Indo-Pacific is free, open, and inclusive.
Convergences and Divergences Between India’s and South Korea’s Indo-Pacific Strategies
Convergences
- Adherence to a Rules-Based Order: India and South Korea both prioritize a rules-based international order in the Indo-Pacific. India does so by its engagement with the Quad and the Indo-Pacific Oceans Initiative (IPOI), and South Korea’s Indo-Pacific strategy also prioritizes compliance with international norms, specifically in maritime security.
- Economic Security and Supply Chain Resilience :Both countries seek to minimize over-reliance on China for key industries. India’s Self-Reliant India policy fits into South Korea’s emphasis on supply chain diversification, especially in semiconductors, green energy, and digital technology.
- Strategic Autonomy in Balancing Major Powers:While the two nations retain close relationships with America, they also attempt to attain some level of strategic autonomy in balancing their relationships with China. South Korea offsets its economic reliance on China against the security relationship with the U.S., while India balances its China problem through a combination of deterrence (Quad, SAGAR policy) and approach (BRICS, SCO).
- Maritime Security and Regional Stability:It prioritizes maritime security and regional cooperation with partners. South Korea engages actively in regional naval exercises, whereas India fosters security cooperation through SAGAR and IPOI.
- Interaction with ASEAN and the Indian Ocean Region:Both nations regard ASEAN as a strategic ally. India’s Act East Policy centers on increased trade and security relations with Southeast Asia, and South Korea’s Indo-Pacific strategy similarly emphasizes ASEAN as one of the key pillars. India also looks further westward into the Indian Ocean, an area that is increasing in importance to South Korea.
Divergences
- Approach to Security Cooperation: India is an active player in security groupings such as the Quad, Indo-Pacific Maritime Domain Awareness (IPMDA), and defense partnerships with the U.S., Japan, and Australia. South Korea, on the other hand, adopts a more circumspect approach, emphasizing diplomacy and economic cooperation over open military alliances. In contrast to India, South Korea does not openly engage in countering China militarily.
- China’s Role in Strategic Calculations :India’s Indo-Pacific strategy is greatly influenced by its border tensions and strategic rivalry with China, and hence, counterbalancing China’s presence becomes the central concern. South Korea, even as it has experienced Chinese economic coercion, steers clear of articulating its Indo-Pacific strategy in counter-China terms and instead espouses an open regional order.
- Extent of Regional Focus :India’s Indo-Pacific approach runs deep into the western Indian Ocean, Africa, and island states such as Sri Lanka and Mauritius under SAGAR. South Korea, on the other hand, is more concentrated on East Asia, Southeast Asia, and the Pacific Islands with minimum involvement in the western Indo-Pacific.
- Diplomatic Style and Strategic Ambitions: India is looking for a leadership position in the geopolitics of Indo-Pacific, whereas South Korea’s strategy is more focused on economic diplomacy and being a “Global Pivotal State.” India presents itself as a net security provider, while South Korea’s role is still more economic and technological.
While India and South Korea have similar objectives in the Indo-Pacific economic resilience, regional stability, and commitment to a rules-based order their strategies diverge. India is more aggressively involved in security architectures, whereas South Korea emphasizes economic and diplomatic approaches. These divergences mirror their respective geopolitical limitations India’s direct territorial and naval rivalry with China and South Korea’s balancing act between the U.S. and China. But their common interest in economic interconnectivity, technological cooperation, and ASEAN integration offers great potential for greater cooperation in the Indo-Pacific.
Expanding India-South Korea Cooperation in the Indo-Pacific: Opportunities and Challenges
- Strengthening Economic Partnerships Beyond Trade
India and South Korea have had robust bilateral trade relations under the Comprehensive Economic Partnership Agreement (CEPA), but there is as yet untapped potential for diversifying this relationship. In the future, the two nations can engage further economically by concentrating on technology-based industrial cooperation, especially in the semiconductors, AI, and clean energy industries. South Korea’s technological prowess and India’s expanding market and digital infrastructure offer synergies for diversified growth in investment and research cooperation (South Korea and India: A Perplexing Partnership, 2023).
Besides, both nations can also cooperate in supply chains of critical minerals to provide immunity against disruptions generated by geopolitical tensions. India, which is the primary importer of rare earth elements for South Korea, can take advantage of India’s emerging mining and processing bases. Joint ventures in lithium and cobalt processing can help secure both nations’ energy interests in the Indo-Pacific region (Cho & Nakano, 2025).
- Maritime and Infrastructure Cooperation
Although India has heavily invested in the development of ports throughout the Indian Ocean Region (IOR) via SAGAR (Security and Growth for All in the Region) initiatives, South Korea’s shipping and logistics capabilities can increase regional maritime infrastructure. One of the areas that could be of common interest is joint port development at major transit points like Sri Lanka, Mauritius, and Indonesia, enhancing maritime trade and connectivity (Padmaja, 2018).
In addition, India and South Korea can deepen coast guard coordination to enhance maritime security, prevent piracy, and hold joint disaster response exercises. South Korea’s participation in anti-piracy operations in the Gulf of Aden can form the basis of expanded cooperation in the IOR. Greater maritime partnerships would assist a rules-based regional order consistent with both countries’ Indo-Pacific visions.
- Defense and Security Collaboration
India and South Korea have moved towards strengthening defense cooperation, such as joint military training exercises and the production of weapons. South Korea’s advanced defense technology industry and India’s increased emphasis on defense manufacturing self-reliance (Atmanirbhar Bharat) present good opportunities for synergy. The K9 Vajra-T howitzer, a South Korean-origin artillery system co-produced in India, is a good example of successful collaboration. Extending this collaboration to naval shipbuilding, missile systems, and cybersecurity can enhance defense ties (L&T Precision Engineering & Systems WINs (Major) Order for K9 Vajra-T Artillery Platforms, 2024).
In addition, increased intelligence sharing and cooperation in counterterrorism operations would be to the advantage of both countries. As cyber threats in the Indo-Pacific region continue to rise, collaborating on cybersecurity systems and AI-based defense technology is another possible area of strategic value.
- Strengthening Multilateral and Regional Engagement
India and South Korea can closely collaborate in regional forums like ASEAN, the Indian Ocean Rim Association (IORA), and the Indo-Pacific Economic Framework (IPEF) to promote common strategic interests. Triangular interactions with Japan and Australia through forums like the Supply Chain Resilience Initiative (SCRI) can enhance regional economic security (India Elected as Vice-Chair of the Supply Chain Council, 2024).
Additionally, South Korea’s growing involvement with the Quadrilateral Security Dialogue (Quad) although not a formal member opens up possibilities for issue-based cooperation in the areas of technology governance, infrastructure investment, and supply chain resilience. India and South Korea can also coordinate in G20 forums to influence global economic policy that is in line with Indo-Pacific development objectives.
- Climate and Energy Security Cooperation
The Indo-Pacific region is increasingly confronting climate and energy security issues, for which India-South Korea partnership in renewable energy initiatives is critical. South Korean hydrogen energy expertise and offshore wind technology can enhance India’s massive solar and wind energy growth under the International Solar Alliance (ISA) (Mattoo, 2024).
One of the priority initiatives would be the creation of a Green Energy Partnership, emphasizing collaborative research on battery storage, electric vehicles (EVs), and hydrogen fuel cells. Enhanced cooperation in climate finance and technology transfers would also guarantee sustainable energy transitions for both countries.
Conclusion
The changing Indo-Pacific dynamics have rendered the contributions of India and South Korea more prominent, with both countries trying to navigate the changing power equations within the region. Though their approaches differ in practice, they have common objectives of enhancing stability, economic resilience, and a rules-based order. India’s Indo-Pacific policy, underpinned by its Act East Policy and SAGAR strategy, focuses on security, maritime stewardship, and counterbalancing China’s expanding footprint. South Korea, with its Indo-Pacific Strategy and New Southern Policy, is more economically oriented while balancing its diplomatic relationship between the United States and China. These are differences based on their respective geopolitical realities, but their common interest in multilateralism, economic cooperation, and regional security presents many opportunities for cooperation.
Economic cooperation between India and South Korea has huge potential beyond the conventional trade agreement. The Comprehensive Economic Partnership Agreement (CEPA) has built a solid basis, but closer integration in vital areas such as semiconductors, artificial intelligence, and renewable energy can promote greater collaboration. South Korea’s technological strength and India’s fast-growing digital economy provide complementary strengths that, if leveraged well, can support economic development and innovation. Moreover, both countries have a mutual interest in obtaining key mineral supply chains, specifically for lithium and rare earths, to prevent geopolitical threats and attain technological autonomy. Enhancing these pillars of cooperation would be not only advantageous for bilateral ties but also bolster overall regional stability in the Indo-Pacific.
Maritime safety is another key pillar of India-South Korea relations, especially with both countries standing up for freedom of navigation and a rules-based order in contested seas. India’s significant naval presence in the Indian Ocean falls in line with South Korea’s growing participation in regional security forums, which paves the way for greater cooperation in combined naval exercises, anti-piracy operations, and disaster response arrangements. The potential for co-developing port infrastructure at critical transit points like Sri Lanka and Indonesia also adds to their strategic confluence. Both nations would be able to counterbalance China’s increasing maritime aggression through such efforts while promoting a cooperative and stable maritime environment.
Defense and security cooperation between India and South Korea has seen significant developments, with successful joint efforts like the production of the K9 Vajra-T howitzer in India. Extending this cooperation into naval shipbuilding, missile systems, and cybersecurity would further boost their defense capabilities. In light of increasing cybersecurity threats in the Indo-Pacific, collaborative efforts in artificial intelligence-based defense systems and intelligence sharing would yield reciprocal strategic benefits. In addition, increased involvement in counterterrorism activities and combined military training exercises would strengthen their alliance in regional security issues.
Energy and climate security have become vital issues for Indo-Pacific countries, opening up an added area of India-South Korea collaboration. South Korea’s technological superiority in hydrogen energy and battery storage technology complements India’s vision for renewable energy growth under the International Solar Alliance (ISA). A Green Energy Partnership with a focus on clean energy research, green infrastructure, and climate financing could push collaborative efforts toward carbon neutrality. Harnessing one another’s green technology strength would not only drive environmental sustainability but also forge new economic opportunities for the two nations.
Multilateral outreach continues to be an important part of India and South Korea’s Indo-Pacific initiatives. Their cooperative roles in ASEAN, IORA, and the Indo-Pacific Economic Framework (IPEF) are testimony to their vision for economic integration and regional security. South Korea’s increasing engagement with the Quadrilateral Security Dialogue (Quad), although not a member, provides additional opportunities for trilateral and multilateral cooperation with India, Japan, and Australia. Through increased institutional coordination in multilateral platforms, both countries can deepen their roles in Indo-Pacific governance frameworks.
Albeit the convergences of their Indo-Pacific perspectives, tensions still exist in synchronizing their strategic interests to the fullest. India’s security-driven approach differs from South Korea’s diplomatic balancing strategy, especially when dealing with China. Whereas India focuses on deterring by having strategic alignments such as the Quad, South Korea is conservative in its security alignments to evade economic sanctions from Beijing. Resolving this divergence involves more diplomatic talks and flexible issue-based cooperations that respond to both nations’ strategic compulsions.
In the future, India and South Korea need to leverage their common interests by strengthening institutional coordination and developing strategic synergies. Developing stronger economic partnerships, enhancing defense cooperation, and promoting cooperative efforts in climate security will facilitate sustained engagement in the Indo-Pacific. As the two countries further develop their regional strategy, adapting a pragmatic mindset will be key in meeting emerging challenges and exploiting new opportunities. Through this, India and South Korea will be able to position themselves as key players in the development of a free, open, and rules-based Indo-Pacific order.
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